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THE BRITISH HERITAGE OF SECURITIES
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Bernard J. Kilbride*
T is a common misconception that the philosophy of securities
regulation and the principle of full disclosure originated in the
United States under the direction of the New Deal legislators. In
reality, the chief characteristics of security laws in this country bear
the mark of British ancestry.
Legislators of the first security acts in the United States and the
individual states drew heavily from England's experience and adopted
her philosophy of "full disclosure." Even in those states where securi-
ties must be registered by qualification, the British influence is
present, since disclosure is a prerequisite to qualification.' In order to
promote an understanding of the background of securities legislation
in the United States, this Article traces the major attempts of the
British to control the activities of dealers in stocks from 1696 to the
beginning of the twentieth century.
Nearly three hundred years ago English stockbrokers were using
an open and highly organized securities market to channel the
public's savings into investment opportunities. In comparison with
present standards, the physical facilities were deficient, but trading
techniques were well advanced. The mechanics of the stock market
provided for sales to unknown parties,' purchases on margin,4 put
and call options,s bull and bear sales,' a weekly quotation service,"
and an established rate for brokerage commissions.! The coffee houses
of Change Alley were the centers of trading activity until the middle
of the eighteenth century when the brokers moved into their own
building.' Unimpeded by government control, the "stock market"
* Chairman, Department of Finance, University of Notre Dame. A.B., St. Francis Xavier
University; M.S., Columbia University; Ph.D., University of Texas; C.P.A., State of Texas;
formerly Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Illinois.
' Frequently, in registration by qualification, more extensive information must be filed
about a company's operations than is necessary under registration by notification. The
Colorado Securities Law is an exception, since the contribution of the British philosophy of
full disclosure is clearly evident in the legislation of that state. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
5 125-10-1 to -28 (Supp. 1961).
'See Killik, The Work of the Stock Exchange 14 (2d ed. 1934).
a 1 Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint-Stock Com-
panies to 1720, at 443 (1912).4 Id. at 358.
54 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 338 (2d ed. 1937).
6 Scott, op. cit. supra note 3, at 443.
'Id. at 329.
'Id. at 345.
'Killik, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15.
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of the seventeenth century had developed the mechanism for direct-
ing funds into profitable employment for the advantage of both
borrowers and lenders.
The three years of 1696, 1844, and 1900 are key dates in English
securities legislation. The Brokers Act of 169610 was the first attempt
by the English to apply legislative controls directly to dealings in
stocks and shares. The Report of the Board of Trade, filed in 1844,11
has served not only as the basis of English company law" but also as
the foundation of modern securities regulation in the Common-
wealth and in the United States. Finally, the philosophy of full
disclosure as outlined in the Companies Act of 190013 is a priceless
legacy to investors. The following survey of English securities con-
trol is divided into the three periods corresponding to these dates:
(1) 1696 to 1844; (2) 1844 to 1900; and (3) 1900 to the present.
I. SECURITIES LEGISLATION FROM 1696 TO 1844
Following a report of the Commissioners of Trade in 1696,4
Parliament adopted "An Act to restrain the number and ill prac-
tices of brokers and stock jobbers."" The principal allegations of
the report were directed at the promoters, and the brokers received
only minor mention. The report charged that the promoters had
spread "false or misleading statements, relating to the prospects of
the companies they had formed, and then, as a consequence, the
shares advanced and they sold on a rising market."" In the same
report, brokers were accused of combining in order to raise or lower
stock prices for their own gain.'
The language of the report vividly conveys the low regard in
which those engaged in the sale of stocks and shares were held:
The pernicious art of stock-jobbing hath of late so perverted the end
and design of companies and corporations erected for the introducing
or carrying on of manufactures to the private profit of the first
projectors, that the privileges granted to them have commonly been
made no other use of by the first procurers and subscribers but to
10 Brokers Act, 1696, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 32.
" 7 B.P.P. (1844); see Gower, Modern Company Law 41 (1954).
12 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 41, 57. The term "company" is used to mean a body
of persons associated for purposes of business under the laws of England. The term may
include the joint stock company, the limited company, or the public company (comparable
to the American business corporation), depending upon its usage. For definitions, see Black,
Law Dictionary 352 (4th ed. 1951).
13 Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48.
14 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26.
'5 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 32.
' Scott, op. cit. supra note 3, at 359.
17 Id. at 26.
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sell them with advantage, to ignorant men, drawn in by the reputation,
falsely raised and artfully spread, concerning the thriving state of
their stock. Thus the first undertakers getting quit of the company
by selling their shares for much more than they are really worth to
men allured by the noise of great profit, the management of that trade
and stock comes to fall into unskilful hands, whereby the manu-
facturers intended to be promoted by such grants and put into the
management of companies for their better improvement come, from
very promising beginnings, to dwindle away to nothing and be in a
worse condition than if they were perfectly left free and unassisted
by such laws and patents; an instance whereof we humbly conceive
is to be found in the paper and linen manufactures, which we fear,
feel the effects of this stock-jobbing management and are not in so
thriving a condition as they might have been had they not fallen
under this kind of misfortune."
Many of the provisions of the Brokers Act of 1696, which re-
sulted from the report, are as timely today as they were when it
was passed. The principal method chosen to "restrain the number"
of stockbrokers was a licensing requirement which limited to one
hundred the number of licenses that could be granted to stock-
brokers. These authorized brokers were provided with identification
badges which they were obligated to display after completing each
stock transaction. The act enjoined the brokers from "dealing in
their own accounts" and compelled them to "keep books."' " All but
two of these provisions, the upper limit on the number of brokers
and the identification requirement, seem to have withstood the
test of time.
2
Although it was the rage of speculative frenzy which inflated the
South Sea Bubble in 1720, it was governmental control influenced
by the insistence of directors of the South Sea Company" which
helped to expand the bubble to the bursting point. The directors of
the company urged that restrictions be placed on the formation of
new ventures. The resulting legislation has since become known as
the Bubble Act. Following the passage of that act, speculation did
not cease, but it tended to concentrate on some of the "favourite
companies."" For example, two weeks after the proclamation of the
act, the stock of the South Sea Company reached its highest level
of 1050 pounds. The collapse in the year 1720 began, not with the
Is I Journals of the House of Commons 59 .
'9 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 32.
20 This identification requirement has not completely passed from the legislative scene.
Regulation 16-5 of the Nova Scotia Securities Act requires every registered salesman to pro-
duce his certificate of registration on demand of any person. Similarly, today most states
require that the salesman's license be displayed in a conspicuous manner.
21 Scott, op. cit. supra note 3, at 411.
22 ld. at 417.
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promulgation of the act, but when legal proceedings were initiated
to force certain companies to forfeit their obsolete charters. 3 Public
confidence and strained credit conditions were unable to withstand
the shock caused by the forfeiture actions, and the unstable stock
market began its historic decline.
The Bubble Act, 4 which could be called England's first securities
act," contained some extremely harsh provisions. Section 19 declared
that any company formed after 1724 and operating without a charter,
or with a charter granted for some other purpose, would be con-
sidered a public nuisance; its transactions would be voided; and it
would incur prae-munire The act also provided that merchants
injured by these illegal companies could sue for treble damages and
costs." The penalty for brokers dealing in shares of such companies
was a loss of license and a fine of 500 pounds. Moreover, brokers
were careful not to deal in unregistered stock since the act en-
couraged detection by providing that informers would be entitled
to one-half of any fines collected from brokers.2'
In view of the severity of the Bubble Act, it is not surprising that
it remained virtually a dead letter until its repeal in 1825 (by the
act of Geo. IV, c. 94). Actually the act was superfluous, since public
confidence in joint stock companies and their securities had been
so effectively destroyed by the South Sea debacle that it was three-
quarters of a century before there was even another boom. What
was needed at the time of the crisis was a law which would have
made incorporation easy and inexpensive; but, unfortunately, the
opposite situation resulted and persisted until 1844. One authority
tersely evaluated the Bubble Act in the following words: "If the
legislature had intended the Bubble Act to suppress companies they
had succeeded beyond their reasonable expectations; if as seems more
probable, they had intended to protect investors from ruin and to
safeguard the South Sea Company, they failed miserably."2
During the relative inactivity of the stock market for the eighty
years following the passage of the Bubble Act, speculative activity
and securities control remained at a virtual standstill. Prior to the
23 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 29.
1
4 Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporations Act, 1720, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18.
2 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 28.
2 Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporations Act, 1720, 6 Geo. 3, c. 18, 5
19. "Praemunire" in English law meant a non-capital offense against the king and his gov-
ernment. Black, Law Dictionary 1337 (4th ed. 19 1).
2' Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporations Act, 1720, § 20.
's Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporations Act, 1720, 5 21.29 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 30.
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repeal of the act in 1825, only three further attempts" were made
to regulate the stock market, and these were only half-hearted ven-
tures which made no contribution to securities legislation.
At the turn of the eighteenth century, speculative activity again
gathered momentum. Under the impetus of war and the growth of
railroads, speculation returned with a vigor which was "nearly as
wild as in the South Sea Bubble."'" The renewed force was tem-
porarily halted by the Panic of 1825, and it took nine years for the
speculators to regain their confidence."
The lack of adequate companies legislation and protection for in-
vestors was emphasized when most promoters resorted to the unin-
corporated entity. Since the unincorporated joint stock companies
were then playing a significant part in the English economy, it be-
came imperative that they gain legal status. Following a number of
abortive attempts to provide a legal basis for those companies, Parlia-
ment in 1841 appointed William Gladstone as chairman of a com-
mittee to study the problem. The result of Gladstone's work, which
earned for him the title of "father of modern company law," was the
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844-the main topic of the follow-
ing period.
II. SECURITIES LEGISLATION FROM 1844 TO 1900
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 is a milestone in the
history of English company law. For the first time, in England, a
legal distinction was made between private partnerships and joint
stock companies. In addition, the act removed the costly and burden-
some necessity of a special act or charter in order to gain corporate
status in favor of permitting incorporation by registration. Moreover,
the prospectus provision contained in the act marked the beginning
of modern securities legislation.
Gladstone, as the chairman of a Select Committee on Joint Stock
Companies, made a report which was to have a lasting effect on the
campaign for adequate disclosure to the investing public. The re-
port stated:
Periodical accounts, if honestly made and fairly audited, cannot fail
to excite attention to the real state of a concern; and by means of
improved remedies, parties to mismanagement may be made more
amenable for acts of fraud and illegality. The early publication,
'
0 1d. at 34. The following acts are cited: Stock Jobbing Act, 1721, 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2,
No. 8; Stock Jobbing Act, 1734, 7 Geo. 2, c. 8; Stock Jobbing Act, 1737, 10 Geo. 2, c. 8.
" Thorp, Speculative Bubbles, 3 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 26 (1937).
"Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 39.
[Vol. 17
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resulting from registration of . . . prospectus and circulars, will
doubtless be useful in controlling . . . undertakings at their out-
set ....
The disclosure provisions contained in the Act of 1844" were not
as important to designers of subsequent securities legislation as was
the establishment of Gladstone's philosophy of full disclosure. Judg-
ing by present standards, the requirements for prospectuses contained
in the Act of 1844 were only in their infancy. The act did not define
the term "prospectus" but used the word in the same sense as cir-
cular, handbill, or public notice." The principal provisions of the
act which related to the prospectus required that a copy of it, "or
circular, handbill, or advertisement, or other such document . . .
addressed to the public . . .""' be first submitted to the Registrar of
Joint Stock Companies. The contents of the prospectus were not
specified; however, promoters had to file certain information with
the Registrar. The filing required: the name, location, and purpose
of the company; names of the promoters, officers, and subscribers;
and names of the members of the committee acting in the forma-
tion of the company. '
Equally important for investor protection at that time were the
provisions for shareholder information, access to company books
of account, selection of auditors, and limitations on activities of
the directors. The companies were required to compile semiannually
a "full and fair" balance sheet which was to be signed by at least
three directors and "confirmed" by the auditors. 3 That document
was to be made available to the shareholders who attended the general
meeting." If the auditors were not able to certify the balance sheet,
then they were to report in person to the directors of the company.4'
Inspection of company records by shareholders and auditors was
provided for in the act but with certain limitations. Shareholders
were entitled to examine the books and the balance sheet during the
fourteen days which preceded the ordinary (general) meeting.4' At
other times, it was necessary for the shareholders to obtain an au-
thorization signed by three directors. The auditors, however, were
a"The Report of the Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies, 7 B.P.P. (1844),
as cited by Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act, Fortune Magazine, Aug. 1933, p. 53.
SJoint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110.
3 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 4.
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 4.
a Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 5 4.
3s Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 55 35, 39, 41.3 9Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 36.
4 0 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 41.
"' Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, S 37.
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granted unlimited access to the books by section 40 of the act, pro-
vided that the examinations were conducted at a "reasonable time
of day."'4
Although auditors' qualifications were not mentioned in the Com-
panies Act of 1844, provisions for representation of stockholders
by at least one auditor were made. Section 38 required that at least
one auditor be appoined by the shareholders at the annual meeting.
In the event that the appointee of the owners did not act or was
unable to act, then the Committee of the Privy Council of Trade
was authorized "to appoint an auditor on behalf of the shareholders.""'
The other elements of the Act of 1844 which provided safeguards
for the investor dealt with the activities of the company directors.
The Gladstone Committee, recognizing the favored position of direc-
tors, had recommended that two major limitations be placed on
directors' relations with their companies, and the restrictions were
subsequently embodied in the act. First, section 27 prohibited them
from borrowing from the company without shareholder approval.
The second provision required members of the board who had any
contracts with the company to disclose the details for scrutiny by
the stockholders.
These were the main provisions of the act which were concerned
directly or indirectly with securities legislation. The Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844 established one precedent for English securi-
ties control-the incorporation of the prospectus provision as part
of the companies acts rather than in separate blue sky legislation.
These provisions, while not advanced by present standards, represent
the first principal legislative endeavors to correct stock market abuses.
Although none of the Companies Acts of the nineteenth century
contained any specific reference to secondary distributions as the
term is understood today, the Companies Act of 1844 did make it
unlawful for any person to sell or dispose for consideration his shares
until a "Certificate of Complete Registration" had been obtained by
the corporation. The Certificate of Complete Registration was issued
by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies only after certain in-
formation had been filed with him. By present standards, the in-
formation filed was of limited value. For example, the promoters, in
addition to giving the name and description of the company, had
to reveal the amount of debt and equity capital, the number of shares,
the names of subscribers and the amounts subscribed, the identity of
directors, and the trustees and auditors of the company. Provided
'Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 37.
41 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, § 38.
[Vol. 17
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this data and information concerning any material changes had been
filed with the Registrar, it was not necessary to receive any clearance
for the equivalent of a secondary issue.
After a serious setback in 1847 and one of lesser consequence in
1856, securities legislation tended to evolve gradually in answer to
the needs of the time. In 1847, Parliament removed the necessity of
"registration of such prospectuses and advertisements" on the ground
that they were "found to be very burdensome to the promoters of
such companies."" The omission of this important procedure was
not corrected until the Companies Act of 1900.41 More backtracking
occurred in 1856 when the compulsory audit and the necessity for
Board of Trade approval of the company auditors were eliminated.
The annual audit was not again compelled by law until the Act of
1900; however, most companies continued to require an annual audit
by including a provision for it in the company bylaws.0
During the remainder of the nineteenth century, only three acts
had any lasting significance for securities legislation: the Companies
Acts of 1862 and 1864, and the Directors' Liability Act of 1890.
The Act of 1862, 4' a consolidation of previous companies acts,
consisted of 212 sections and 3 schedules. Section 56 of this act
empowered the Board of Trade to appoint inspectors to examine
affairs of a company upon a petition of one-fifth of the company's
shareholders. The results of any such examination were to be reported
to the Board of Trade rather than directly to the company. The Act
of 1862 also advanced the cause for adequate disclosure of public
information by adoption of section 174, which gave every person
the right to examine all company documents kept by the Registrar
of Joint Stock Companies.
The efforts of the Act of 186441 to provide the public with
more detailed information were soon thwarted by promoters. Sec-
tion 38 of that act required that the prospectus "specify dates
and names of parties" to (but not contents of) any contract
made prior to the issue of the prospectus. The act not only fail-
ed to set out a time or place for examination of such contracts"
but also failed to require that the prospectus be filed with the
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. The failure to disclose the
existence of such contracts in a written solicitation (the pros-
" Joint Stock Companies Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., c. 78, § 4.
4s Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 43.
46 Id. at 48.
" Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89.
48Companies Act, 1864, 27 & 28 Vict., c. 131.
49 Gore-Browne, A Handbook of Joint Stock Companies 128 (35th ed. 1922).
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pectus was undefined at that time) to subscribers rendered the
prospectus "fraudulent on the part of the promoters, directors and
officers of the company knowingly issuing the same,"' 0 and a sub-
scriber relying on those statements could recover damages from any
of the named parties. However, not satisfied with the loopholes con-
tained in section 38, promoters evaded the disclosure requirements of
this section by inserting a waiver of such rights in the subscriber's ap-
plication for shares." Another method of circumventing the dis-
closure requirement was simply not to make any written solicitations,
although that approach was less popular because of its cumbersome
nature. These two discrepancies in section 3 8 were to be corrected by
the first two companies acts to appear in the twentieth century-the
Companies Act of 1900 and the Companies Act of 1907.
In 1889, the Derry v. Peek case" emphasized the lack of protection
and legal recourse available to minority stockholders against decep-
tions of directors. The House of Lords held in this case that a
director's firm belief in a statement contained in the prospectus, in
spite of the absence of reasonable grounds for belief, was a sufficient
defense against the plaintiff. To close this hiatus, Parliament passed
the Directors' Liability Act in 1890." Under that legislation directors
and others associated with the prospectus could be made liable for
damages if the complaining stockholder could "show that the con-
tract was induced by an untrue statement of a material fact, whether
made innocently or not."'" A director could still avoid liability by
proving that the untrue statement was part of a report of a
competent "expert."" The Directors' Liability Act of 1890 is now
section 43 of the English Companies Act of 1948," and its influence
can be seen in the United States' Securities Act of 1933.5'
III. SECURITIEs LEGISLATION FROM 1900 TO THE PRESENT
The Companies Acts of 1900" and of 1907"' were notable from
the point of view of investor protection for two reasons in particular:
(1) for the first time, the acts required that the prospectus contain
a respectable amount of specific information about the company and
50Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131.
51 Gore-Browne, op. cit. supra note 49, at 130.
"2 [1889] 14 A. C. 337.
53 Gower, op. cit. supra note 11, at 53.
54 Gore-Browne, op. cit. supra note 49, at 139.
5" Id. at 146.
"3Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38.
5748 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958).
"Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48.
"Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 50.
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the new offering; and (2) the acts banned the circuitous methods of
avoiding many prospectus requirements. The prospectus, which was
defined by section 30 of the 1900 Companies Act to include any
written solicitation to the public, was required of those issuing shares
on behalf of the company or on behalf of the promoters in addition
to issues handled by the company itself. Section 9, filling a void
left by previous legislation, made it mandatory that a prospectus
be filed with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies before being
issued to the public.
The disclosure requirements of section 10 of the 1900 Companies
Act marked the introduction of the prospectus as one of the most
important devices of securities regulation. The "names and addresses
of the vendors of any property" had to be disclosed. The number
of shares or debentures issued for any property along with the dis-
closure of the amount paid for good will had to be set out clearly.
Furthermore, the act required that the activities of directors and
their business relations with the company be delineated for the in-
formation of the potential investors. Such items as names, descrip-
tions, and addresses of directors, the number of shares each director
had to own in order to qualify for that position, and the full par-
ticulars of each director's interest (if any) in the promotion had to
be published in the prospectus.
Section 10 further specified that disclosures be made concerning
the amount or estimated amount of organization expenses, the com-
missions paid for procuring subscriptions, the amounts to be paid
to any promoter as well as the reason for the payment, and the
names and addresses of the auditors appointed. A final item, which
is considered by some to be the most important,"0 supplemented the
contract disclosure requirement of section 38 of the 1867 Companies
Act. The dates and parties to all material contracts (other than those
entered into in the ordinary course of business) and the place where
these contracts could be examined were required to be set out in
the prospectus.1
With the aid of section 10 of the 1900 Companies Act, the word
**prospectus" took on a new meaning and use for the investment
world. The current prospectus requirements of securities legislation
in England, the United States, and Canada may be traced to that
very section.
Parliament inadvertently left open to unscrupulous promoters one
major method of evading disclosure requirements. The provisions of
60 Gore-Browne, op. cit. supra note 49, at 126.
61 Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, S 10(k).
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section 10 applied only if a prospectus were issued. Hence if a pro-
moter desired to evade disclosure, he could do so by confining all
offers to sell to oral solicitations. Although this placed a burden on
sales efforts, it made it even more difficult for a complaining stock-
holder to sue the promoter or directors. The situation was rectified
when the Companies Act of 1907 introduced a new requirement
known as the "Statement in Lieu of Prospectus.""' It compelled any
public company which did not issue a prospectus to the public to make
known its affairs by filing with the Registrar a "Statement in Lieu
of Prospectus." That document had to be signed by every director
or proposed director and contain virtually the same information that
would be required in a prospectus. Any allotment of shares or bonds
made before filing a "Statement in Lieu of Prospectus" was voided
by section 1 of the Companies Act of 1907.
The mass of company legislation which had been enacted after
1862 was consolidated in the Companies (Consolidation) Act of
1908. That act and the company legislation which preceded it were
the major sources, up to that time, from which securities legislation
in Anglo-Saxon countries has been drawn. The more recent develop-
ments in English company law have had less influence in shaping
securities regulation in the United States and in Canada.
62 Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 50.
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